The intellect also enables us to apprehend the goodness a thing has. The appetitive power of reason is called the will. Aquinas describes the will as a native desire for the understood good. On this view, all acts of will are dependent on antecedent acts of intellect; the intellect must supply the will with the object to which the latter inclines.
Most goods do not have a necessary connection to happiness. That is, we do not need them in order to be happy; thus the will does not incline to them of necessity ST Ia But what of those goods that do have a necessary connection to happiness? According to Aquinas, the will does not incline necessarily to these goods, either. For in this life we cannot see God in all his goodness, and thus the connection between God, virtue, final happiness will always appear opaque.
In this life, then, our intellectual limitations prevent us from apprehending what is good simpliciter. Instead, we are presented with competing goods between which we must choose ST Ia Some goods provide immediate gratification but no long-term fulfillment. Other goods may precipitate hardship but eventually make us better people. Indeed, sometimes we must exercise considerable effort in ignoring superficial or petty pleasures while attending to more difficult yet enduring goods.
This happens whenever we, through our own determination, direct our attention away from certain desirable objects and toward those we think are more choiceworthy.
Of course, our character will often govern the goods we desire and ultimately choose. Even so, Aquinas does not think that our character wholly determines our choices, as evidenced by the fact that we sometimes make decisions that are contrary to our established habits. This is actually fortunate for us, for it suggests that even people disposed toward evil can manage to make good choices and perhaps begin to correct their more hardened and inordinate inclinations.
Now we are prepared to answer the question posed at the beginning of this section: what actions are those we can designate as human? Unlike non-rational animals, human beings choose their actions according to a reasoned account of what they think is good.
Seen this way, human actions are not products of deterministic causal forces. They are products of our own free judgment liberum arbitrium , the exercise of which is a function of both intellect and will ST Ia Aquinas also thinks that the good in question functions as an end—the object for the sake of which the agent acts. There are two worries that emerge here, both of which can be resolved rather quickly.
First, it seems we do not always act for the sake of an end. Many actions we perform are not products of our own deliberation and voluntary judgment like nervous twitches, coughs, or unconscious tapping of the foot.
Second, it appears that Aquinas is mistaken when he says that the ends for the sake of which we act are good. Clearly, many things we pursue in life are not good. Aquinas does not deny this. He agrees that cognitive errors and excessive passion can distort our moral views and, in turn, incline us to choose the wrong things. Whether the ends we pursue are in fact good is a separate question—one to which we will return below.
Aquinas does not simply wish to defend the claim that human acts are for the sake of some good. Following Augustine, he insists that our actions are for the sake of a final good—a last end which we desire for its own sake and for the sake of which everything else is chosen ST Ia 1. If there was no such end, we would have a hard time explaining why anyone chooses to do anything at all. The reason for this is as follows. According to this view, such a good is a catalyst for desire and is therefore necessary in order for us to act for the sake of what we desire.
Were you to remove the intrinsically desirable end, then you would remove the very principle that motivates us to act in the first place ST IaIIae 1. For the existence of an indefinite series of ends would mean that there is no intrinsically desirable good for the sake of which we act.
In the absence of any such good, we would not desire anything and thus never have the necessary motivation to act Ibid. So there must be a last end or final good that we desire for its own sake. This last claim still does not capture what Aquinas ultimately wishes to show, namely, that there is a single end for the sake of which all of us act ST IaIIae 1.
To put the matter as starkly as possible, Aquinas wants to argue that every human act of every human being is for the sake of a single end that is the same for everyone ST IaIIae 1. The previous argument did not require us to think that the final end for which we act is the same for everyone.
Nor did it show that the end at which every human being aims consists in a specific, solitary good as opposed to a constellation of goods. What, exactly, is this last end at which we aim? As we saw in the preceding section, all of us seek after our own perfection ST Ia 1.
We do so by performing actions we think will—directly or indirectly—contribute to or facilitate a life that is more complete or fulfilling than it would be otherwise. Admittedly, this claim is fairly abstract and uncontroversial. After all, Aquinas does not say what happiness consists in—the thing in which it is realized.
He simply wishes to show that there is something everyone desires and pursues, namely, ultimate fulfillment. But while everyone acts for the sake of such an end abstractly conceived, Aquinas recognizes that there is considerable disagreement over what it is in which happiness consists ST IaIIae 1. So there is a difference between the idea of the last end an idea for the sake of which everyone acts and the specific object in which the last end is thought to consist Ibid.
Some people think that the last end consists in the acquisition of external goods, like riches, power, or fame ST IaIIae 2. And still others think that happiness consists in acquiring goods of the soul such as knowledge, virtue, and friendship ST IaIIae 2. But as laudable as some of these good are particularly those of the latter category , they are all beset with unique deficiencies that preclude them from providing the kind of complete fulfillment characteristic of final happiness.
What is it, then, in which our last end really consists or is realized? For Aquinas, the last end of happiness can only consist in that which is perfectly good, which is God. Aquinas refers to this last end—the state in which perfect happiness consists—as the beatific vision.
The beatific vision is a supernatural union with God, the enjoyment of which surpasses the satisfaction afforded by those goods people sometimes associate with the last end. But if perfect happiness consists in the beatific vision, then why do people fail to seek it? Actually, all people do seek it—at least in some sense.
As we have already noted, all of us desire our own perfection, which is synonymous with final happiness. Unfortunately, many of our actions are informed by mistaken views of what happiness really consists in. But more than likely, our mistaken views will be the result of certain appetitive excesses that corrupt our understanding of what is really good.
For this reason, good actions require excellences—or virtues—of both mind and appetite. The next section seeks to explain more fully what those virtues are and why we need them. Aquinas offers several definitions of virtue. Because we know that reason is the proper operation of human beings, it follows that a virtue is a habit that disposes us to reason well.
This account is too broad for our present purposes. While all virtues contribute in some way to our rational perfection, not every virtue disposes us to live morally good lives. For the purposes of this essay, our concern will be with those virtues that are related to moral decision and action. A cursory glance at the second part of the Summa Theologiae would reveal a host of virtues that are indicative of human goodness.
They are the principle habits on which the rest of the virtues hinge cardo Rickaby, To put the matter another way, each cardinal virtue refers to a general type of rectitude that has various specifications. Any virtue the point of which is to promote discretion with respect to action will be considered a part of prudence. Similarly, temperance concerns the moderation of passion, and thus will include any virtue that seeks to restrain those desires of a more or less insatiable sort Ibid.
Moreover, Aquinas thinks the cardinal virtues provide general templates for the most salient forms of moral activity: commanding action prudence ; giving to those what is due justice ; curbing the passions temperance ; and strengthening the passions against fear courage IaIIae A more detailed sketch of these virtues follows although I will address them in an order that is different from the one Aquinas provides. In order to act well, we need to make good judgments about how we should behave.
In order to make good moral judgments, a twofold knowledge is required: one must know 1 the general moral principles that guide actions and 2 the particular circumstances in which a decision is required. ST IaIIae This passage may appear to suggest that prudence involves a fairly simple and straightforward process of applying moral rules to specific situations.
But this is somewhat misleading since the activity of prudence involves a fairly developed ability to evaluate situations themselves. From this perspective, good decisions will always be responsive to what our situation requires. Thus we cannot simply consult a list of moral prescriptions in determining what we should do.
According to Aquinas, then, the virtue of prudence is a kind of intellectual aptitude that enables us to make judgments that are consonant with and indeed ordered to our proper end ST IaIIae Note here that prudence does not establish the end at which we aim. Nor does prudence desire that end; for whether we desire our proper end depends on whether we have the rights sorts of appetitive inclinations as we shall see below. According to Aquinas, prudence illuminates for us the course of action deemed most appropriate for achieving our antecedently established telos.
It does this through three acts: 1 counsel , whereby we inquire about the available means of achieving the end; 2 judgment , whereby we determine the proper means for achieving the end; and finally 3 command , whereby we apply that judgment ST IIaIIae While we need a range of appetitive excellences in order to make good choices, we also need certain intellectual excellences as well. That is, we must be able to deliberate and choose well with respect to what is ultimately good for us.
As a cardinal virtue, prudence functions as a principal virtue on which a variety of other excellences hinge. Those excellences include: memory, intelligence, docility, shrewdness, reason, foresight, circumspection, and caution ST IIaIIae Without these excellences, we may commit a number of cognitive errors that may prevent us from acting in a morally appropriate way.
We may also act for the sake of goods that are contrary to our nature. This invariably happens when the passions cloud our judgment and make deficient objects of satisfaction look more choiceworthy than they really are. In order to make reliable judgments about what is really good, our passions need some measure of restraint so that they do not corrupt good judgment. In short, prudence depends on virtues of the appetite, and it is to these virtues we now turn.
Temperance has a twofold meaning. In its more restricted sense, temperance concerns the moderation of physical pleasures, especially those associated with eating, drinking, and sex ST IIaIIae We display a common propensity to sacrifice our well-being for the sake of these transient goods.
Aquinas does not think that temperance eradicates our desire for bodily pleasure. Nor does he think that temperance is a matter of desiring physical pleasure less.
Such a description suggests that physical gratification is an innately deficient type of enjoyment. Yet Aquinas denies this. According to Aquinas, the purpose of temperance is to refine the way we enjoy bodily pleasures.
Specifically, it creates in the agent a proper sense of moderation with respect to what is pleasurable. For a person can more easily subordinate herself to reason when her passions are not excessive or deficient.
On this view, bodily enjoyment can in fact be an integral part of a rational life. For the moderated enjoyment of bodily pleasure safeguards the good of reason and actually facilitates a more enduring kind of satisfaction.
Like prudence, temperance is a cardinal virtue. There are a host of subsidiary virtues that fall under temperance because they serve to modify the most insatiable human passions. For example, chastity , sobriety and abstinence —which denote a retrenchment of sex, drink, and food, respectively—are predictably all parts of temperance.
Yet there are other virtues associated with temperance that may strike the reader as surprising. For example, Aquinas argues that humility is a part of temperance. Humility aims to restrain the immoderate desire for what one cannot achieve. While humility is not concerned with tempering the appetites associated with touch, it nevertheless consists in a kind of restraint and thus bears a formal resemblance to temperance.
Thus Aquinas also thinks meekness , clemency , and studiousness are parts of temperance. They, too, restrain certain appetitive drives: specifically anger, the desire to punish, and the desire to pursue vain curiosities, respectively.
Temperance and its subsidiary virtues restrain the strong appetite, such as the sexual appetite But courage and its subsidiary virtues modify what Aquinas calls the irascible appetite.
In these cases we may refuse to endure the pain or discomfort required for achieving our proper human good. Note here that fear is not innately contrary to reason. After all, there are some things that we should fear, like an untimely death or a bad reputation.
In these cases, we need a virtue that moderates those appetites that prevent from undertaking more daunting tasks. According to Aquinas, courage is that virtue. We need courage to restrain our fears so that we might endure harrowing circumstances. Yet courage not only mollifies our fears, it also combats the unreasonable zeal to overcome them.
Without courage, we will be either governed by irrational fear or a recklessness that eschews good counsel, making us vulnerable to harm unnecessarily.
Like prudence and temperance, courage is a cardinal virtue. Those with courage will also have a considerable degree of endurance. We know that a cunning person who is not concerned about behaving ethically can employ reason in ways that are not virtuous. Reason, then, does not guarantee virtue. Aquinas answers the first question, in effect, by explaining that we are simultaneously unique individuals as well as socially responsible beings. In a word, we are persons. What we should do, essentially, is love.
The way we express love is through virtue. If we are bereft of virtue, we are unable to express love. Finally, our destiny is happiness beatitude that begins in this world, but is consummated with God. The difference between the ethics of Aristotle and Aquinas has to do with how virtue comes about.
It is reasonable to be virtuous. Surely "honesty is the best policy. And virtue, for Aristotle, lies between two extremes. Thus, the virtue of courage, for example, is the midpoint between the vices of timidity and foolishness. This is all very sensible, though something is missing. Perhaps Aristotle overestimated our capacity to be reasonable and under-estimated the importance of love.
Whereas Aristotle links virtue to reason, Aquinas links it more properly to love. Therefore, as the Angelic doctor states, "Love is the form of all virtues. In his book The Four Loves , C. Aristotle and Aquinas have been equivocated by many philosophers and theologians due to the symmetry of their respective philosophies.
This treatment of these two philosophers does an injustice to their work as it forces Aristotle into a Thomistic shape and Aquinas into an Aristotelian shape; however, in both cases, the forms of their philosophies are two different to fit the respective shapes.
In some cases the similarity may only be in the words that are used. Upon a deeper examination the appearance of substantial differences come to light that point to dissimilarities that make Aquinas and Aristotle less of a hyphenated philosophy and more like cobelligerents in similar streams of thinking. Joseph Owens, in an essay in the Cambridge Companion to Aquinas, examines some of the substantial differences between the two philosophers that demonstrate the cleavages.
However, their differences lie both in their presuppositions and where they go with their philosophies as well as where they end up. In most cases, the differences lie in the fact that Aquinas had some place to go in continuing down a road that Aristotle saw no need to continue down precisely because of his Grecian theological presuppositions.
First, Aristotle does not differentiate between being and essence where as for Aquinas this distinction is very real and quite necessary. But things can be one in two ways; for some things are one which are associated as interchangeable things, like principal and cause; and some are interchangeable not only in the sense that they are one and the same numerically [or in the subject] but also in the sense that they are one and the same conceptually, like garment and clothing.
Aristotle sees no real reason to spend very much time concerning himself with the topic; however, this issue is critical for Aquinas in dealing with issues like the indestructibility of Human souls, animals, among other issues. So in the intellect there is a double activity corresponding to those two. Thus, Aquinas not only disagrees with Aristotle, but also has basis for such a disagreement through the Church patrimony. Aquinas was concerned with the Aristotelian tenet of the sempiternity of the universe.
This doctrine is tied to other Aristotelian ideas that are contrary to the Christian philosophy as crafted by Aquinas. Further, such substances must also be immaterial; for they must be eternal if anything else is. Hence they are actualities. From this reasoning, then, it is evident that here Aristotle firmly though and believed that motion must be eternal and also time; otherwise he would not have based his plan if investigating immaterial substances on this conviction…And aside from the other arguments which he does not touch upon here, it is evident that the argument which he does give here to prove that time is eternal is not demonstrative.
But a first cause is the cause of all things.
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